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#2A-8/13/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWARK VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U.-78.07 
NEWARK VALLEY CARDINAL BUS DRIVERS. 
NYSUT, AFT/AFL-CIO. LOCAL 43 60. 
Charging Party. 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI. ESQS.. for Respondent 
JOHN M. CALLAHAN, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Newark 
Valley Cardinal Bus Drivers. NYSUT, AFT/AFL-CIO. Local 4360 
(Local 4360) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge against the Newark Valley Central 
School District (District). The charge alleges that the 
District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
unilaterally altering a term and condition of employment in 
that it changed health insurance plans on October 1, 1984. 
The change in health insurance involved the manner of 
funding of the coverage. Prior to October 1, 1984, the 
District covered its employees directly with Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield (Carriers) by paying a premium yto them. 
Thereafter, the Carriers provided the same benefits, but the 
I 9829 
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District had become a participant in the Broome-Tioga-
Delaware Health Plan (Plan), paying its share of the premium 
to the Plan with the Plan making payments to the Carriers. 
The immediate result of the change was a substantial 
drop in costs. For example, an employee's contribution for 
family coverage which, pursuant to the collective bargaining 
agreement reached by Local 4360 and the District, is 15% of 
the total charge, had been $26.08 prior to October 1, 1984. 
and thereafter $21.02. Obviously, the District's 85% 
contribution dropped proportionately. 
The primary reason for the reduced costs was that 
billing was changed from a premium-based system to a 
claims-based system. Before October 1, 1984, the Carriers 
billed the District on the basis of actuarial assumptions, 
including the risk of unanticipated excessive claims. 
Thereafter, the Carriers billed the Plan for reimbursement of 
claims that it paid, the risk of unanticipated excessive 
claims being borne by the Plan. This risk, however, was 
capped by a stop-loss policy issued by the Carriers at 125% 
of the anticipated claims. Accordingly, while the change 
resulted in an immediate drop in employee and District 
contributions, there is a risk that those contributions will 
increase. 
The ALJ determined that the change made did not 
constitute a violation. He found that the employees' 
coverage both before and after the change were identical, and 
E 9830 
Board - U-7807 -3 
that they were provided by the Carriers under their own 
administration, which made the process subject to the 
scrutiny of the New York State Insurance Department. 
Affirming these findings, we conclude that the benefits have 
not been changed.— 
On the other hand, the cost of the benefits have been 
changed for both the employees and the District, and while 
the change has been beneficial for them, there is a risk that 
it may become detrimental. Obviously, a change in the actual 
or potential cost of health insurance benefits to unit 
employees is a mandatory subject of negotiation. The ALJ did 
not deal with this issue, viewing the charge as being limited 
to whether the District could unilaterally decide to 
participate in the plan. Local 4360's exceptions now focus 
our attention on this issue and we find that the subject 
actual or potential costs to unit employees has been dealt 
with in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The 
sole relevant reference in that agreement is: "The school 
district will contribute 85% of the premium for health and 
dental insurance. The employee will contribute 15%." This 
language was carried forward from their prior agreements. 
During negotiations for the current agreement, the District 
I/Cf. CSD of the City of Corning. 16 PERB ir3056 (1983) 
and City of Batavia, 16 PERB 1f3092 (1983). 
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had sought to cap its contributions. Local 4360 had 
responded that there should be no change in the contract 
clause, and it had been successful. 
We understood these events as indicating that the 
subject of insurance costs assessible to unit employees have 
been negotiated. Local 4360 neither sought nor obtained an 
assurance that those assessments would be capped. Instead, 
it relied upon the District which had to contract for the 
insurance coverage and to pay the major part of its cost, to 
hold the line on costs. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District satisfied its duty to negotiate the costs 
assessible to the unit employees for the health insurance 
2/ benefits.— 
Local 4360 argues that the change constituted improper 
unilateral action because by joining the Plan, the District 
had committed itself to the Plan for two years, and thereby 
diminished its ability to negotiate the subject of health 
insurance in the future. The ALJ correctly rejected this 
argument, noting that the District's statutory duty to 
negotiate health insurance continues unimpaired, its entry 
into the Plan notwithstanding. 
i/Having reached this conclusion, we need not 
consider the merits of the ALJ's decision and, in 
particular, one of its alternative grounds for dismissal, 
that under the circumstances recited in his decision. Local 
4360 had been obligated to object to the change before it 
was adopted, and therefore had waived its right to 
negotiate the matter by its silence. 
I-. 9832 
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In addition. Local 4360 makes four other arguments for 
the proposition that the change was so substantial as to 
constitute unilateral action: 1) the District is no longer 
the policy holder, the policy holder now being the Plan; 
2) the District no longer pays the premium, but merely pays 
an assessment to the Plan; 3) the District would be bound by 
changes made jointly by the Plan and the Carriers; and 4) by 
joining the Plan the District has obligated employees to 
make contributions that go beyond their proportionate share 
of the premium and cover the proportionate share of the 
administrative costs of the Plan. Having reviewed the 
record, we reject each of these arguments on the ground that 
it is not supported by the evidence. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: August 13. 198 5 
Albany. New York 
^^-^c^U^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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V_/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
*) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7817 
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
NON-TEACHING PROFESSIONALS 
ORGANIZATION, NEA/NY. 
Charging Party. 
ROBERT E. GRAY. ESQ.. for Respondent 
DR. G. J. FABIANO. NEA/NY. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Hudson 
Valley Community College (College) to the determination of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law. The violation is 
that the College failed to pay increases to some employees 
which would have been paid but for the pendency of a 
representation petition. 
The record shows that prior to 1984. non-teaching 
professionals were given salary increases effective each 
* 9834 
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September 1. The salary increases were distributed on the 
basis of merit and ranged from zero to a maximum amount 
determined by the President and the Board of Trustees of the 
College. There was an appellate procedure available to 
those dissatisfied with the amount of their increase. 
In January 1984, the Hudson Valley Community College 
Non-Teaching Professionals Organization, NEA/NY (Union) 
filed a petition to represent a number of the College's 
non-teaching professionals. That petition was still pending 
in September 1984, at which time the College gave increases 
to nine non-teaching professionals not covered by the 
petition, but not to any of the other non-teaching 
professionals. After the decision of the Director excluding 
12 of the non-teaching professionals covered by the petition 
on the ground that they were managerial or confidential 
employees—' the College gave increases to these employees 
retroactive to September 1984. 
On January 2. 1985, this Board affirmed the decision of 
the Director, with one change; one of the positions excluded 
2/ as managerial by the Director was placed in a unit.— 
I/County of Rensselaer. 17 PERB ir4060 (1984). 
^County of Rensselaer, 18 PERB 1[3001 (1985). 
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The effect of all this is that those who were not sought or 
who were excluded from the unit found to be appropriate were 
considered eligible for an increase, while, with the 
exception of the one employee whose status was changed by 
this Board's decision, those placed in the unit were not. 
3 / 
The union was certified on January 29, 1985.— 
The ALJ ruled that the College's conduct constituted 
improper coercion of unit employees and discriminated 
against them by reason of the filing of a petition. The 
basis of the finding is that the College altered a 
preexisting term and condition of employment when it did not 
consider all non-teaching professionals for salary 
adjustments as it had done each September in the past. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
College. It first argues that its decision not to grant 
increases to non-teaching professionals with respect to whom 
it might be required to negotiate was necessary in order to 
permit the terms and conditions of employment of those 
employees to be set by collective negotiations. This 
position is erroneous. A public employer's duty to 
negotiate with a union on behalf of a unit of employees 
commences when the union is recognized or certified as the 
4/ 
representative of those employees.— In the instant 
•2/county of Rensselaer. 18 PERB «ir3000.04. (1985). 
^Section 204.3 of the Taylor Law; Town of Clay, 45 
A.D.2d 292. 7 PERB 1[7012 (4th Dept 1974). / . 
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situation this did not occur until January 29. 1985. Prior 
to that date, and going back to the filing of the petition 
in January 1984, the obligation of the College was to 
maintain the status quo so as not to give the impression to 
the employees covered by the petition that the College might 
take any steps to punish or reward employees for their 
5/ 
exercise of protected rights.— In the instant situation 
that status quo included eligibility for salary increases 
each September 1. 
The College disturbed this status quo. Its reason as 
articulated in its exceptions is that it wished to avoid "an 
escalated 'floor' from which it is anticipated the parties 
are expected to negotiate an agreement." In other words, 
the College, in anticipation of a statutory obligation to 
negotiate, refused to consider employees for raises that 
they might have earned in order to depress the salary base 
for such negotiations. 
The College's second argument is that its conduct could 
not be a violation of §209-a.l(a) or (c) because, as found 
by the ALJ, it had had no "hostile motive". The ALJ used 
the words "hostile motive" in the same sense as this Board 
had used the word "animus" in State of New York (PEF), 
^Section 202 of the Taylor Law; Spencerport CSD, 
12 PERB 1P074 (1979); State of New York (PEF). 10 PERB ir3108 
(1977). 
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supra, meaning hostility to the Union in particular or to 
unionization in general. As we said in State of New York 
(PEF), such hostility and/or animus is not an essential 
element of a violation of §209-a.l(a). Neither is it an 
essential element of a violation of §209-a.l(c). A party is 
presumed to have intended the consequences that it knows or 
should know will inevitably flow from its actions. Here, 
the College conveyed a coercive message to the non-teaching 
professionals that by seeking representation rights they had 
lost eligibility for pay raises for September 1984. and it 
knew, or should have known, that this communicated an 
additional message that unionization would exact further 
costs which might be avoided by withdrawal of the petition 
or by voting against the Union should there be an election. 
Indeed, this is not far from the avowed intention of the 
College to maintain a lower wage floor pending -unionization 
and negotiations. 
The final argument made by the College is that the ALJ 
erred in ordering it to pay interest to any non-teaching 
professional who might have been entitled to an increase in 
September 1984 in that the assessment of such interest 
constitutes exemplary damages. We reject that argument. 
Interest is merely part of the compensation to which wronged 
employees are entitled in order to make them whole for the 
wrong suffered. 
Board - U-7817 
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NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and 
impose the remedial order that he recommended. 
Accordingly, WE ORDER the Hudson Valley Community 
College: 
1. to apply to the non-teaching professionals who are 
in the negotiating unit, the existing criteria 
retroactively for annual salary adjustment for the 
1984-1985 academic year, with interest at the legal 
rate, with respect to those who are thereby 
determined to be eligible to receive such increase; 
and 
2. to cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining, coercing or discriminating against any 
unit employee because of the exercise of any rights 
protected under the Act; and 
3= to sign and post a notice in the form attached at 
all places ordinarily used for communication with 
unit employees. 
DATED: August 13, 1985 
Albany. New York 
) 
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Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randlas, Member 
iuQUuz^ 2v 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify non-teaching professional employees within the unit 
represented by the Hudson Valley Community College Non-Teaching 
Professionals Organization, NEA/NY: 
1. That the Hudson Valley Community College will apply to 
the non-teaching professionals who are in the negotiating unit, the 
existing criteria retroactively for annual salary adjustment for 
the 1984-1985 academic year, with interest at the legal rate, with 
respect to those who are thereby determined to be eligible to 
receive such increase, and 
2. That the Hudson Valley Community College will not interfere 
with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against any unit employee 
because of the exercise of any rights protected under the Act. 
Hudson Valley Community Coliege 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
o 
'This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7856 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC., 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7941 
VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER. 
Charging Party. 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (CLAUDIA R. 
MC KENNA. ESQ.. of Counsel), for CSEA 
GEORGE A. O'HANLON. ESQ., for Village of Port Chester 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association. Inc.. (CSEA) 
and the Village of Port Chester (Village) entered into 
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement to 
succeed one that had expired on March 31. 1984. They 
reached an agreement on May 22. 1984, on all but two issues, 
longevity and the identity of a health insurance carrier, 
and incorporated their agreement into a memorandum,— which 
i^The memorandum indicated that the parties had yet to agree 
upon mutually acceptable language regarding the two issues. 
".984* 
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was ratified by the CSEA membership and the Village's 
Trustees. Thereafter, the Village prepared a collective 
bargaining agreement which it submitted to CSEA for execution. 
CSEA refused to execute the proffered document, claiming that 
it did not reflect the actual terms agreed upon. The parties 
then filed the charges herein. CSEA's charge (U-7856) 
complains that the Village reneged on an agreement to increase 
the pay grade of "sanitation men" from grade nine to ten. The 
Village's charge (U-7941) complains that CSEA refused to 
execute a document embodying the parties' agreement. 
The crux of the dispute is whether the parties agreed to 
an increase in the pay grade of approximately 12 "sanitation 
men". The memorandum of May 22, 1984 refers to an upgrading of 
"laborer". The Village relies upon Schedule A of the parties' 
expired agreement to indicate that "laborer" and "sanitation 
man" are two distinct occupations. Accordingly, it claims, the 
memorandum establishes that it agreed to the upgrading of the 
one "laborer", but not of the twelve "sanitation men". 
CSEA claims that the term "laborer", as used during 
negotiations and in the memorandum of May 22. 1984, included 
"sanitation men". It supported this proposition by the 
testimony of four witnesses, each of whom testified that the 
terms were used interchangeably throughout negotiations. Thus, 
it asserts, the memorandum indicates an agreement that the 
twelve "sanitation men" would be upgraded. 
9842 
Board - U-7856 and U-7941 -3 
The ALJ found that the record evidence supports the 
position of CSEA. In doing so, she made a credibility 
determination that the testimony of CSEA's witnesses was 
more reliable than that of the witness of the Village, who 
denied that the term had been so used during negotiations. 
Accordingly, she found merit in CSEA's charge and none in 
that of the Village. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Village. It argues that the ALJ erred in her assessment of 
the evidence and that, in any event, she was obligated by 
the parol evidence rule to ignore the testimony as to the 
meaning of the word "laborer" in the May 22 agreement, and 
to give it the same meaning as it had in the parties' 
expired agreement. It also argues that the agreement was 
subject to ratification by its Board of Trustees and that if 
the term "laborer" were intended to have a meaning other 
than that which it had in the expired agreement, the 
trustees were not so informed before they ratified the 
agreement and are not bound by it. 
Having reviewed the evidence we find no basis for 
reversing the findings of fact of the ALJ. Even without the 
benefit of observations of the demeanor of the witnesses, we 
would find the testimony of CSEA's witnesses more persuasive 
than that of the Village's witness. The ALJ's resolution of. 
the credibility issue, based on the demeanor of the 
Board - U-7856 and U-7941 
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witnesses, is therefore consistent with our own 
2/ conclusions.—' 
The parol evidence rule gives no support to the 
Village's position. It provides that where a written 
contract fully integrates all the terms of an agreement so 
that there is no uncertainty as to the object and extent of 
that agreement, extrinsic evidence of discussions tending to 
substitute a different agreement is inadmissible in a 
3/ judicial or administrative proceeding.— The parties' 
memorandum of May 22, 1984, was not intended to be a fully 
integrated statement of the parties' agreement; both parties 
anticipated the subsequent preparation and execution of a 
formal contract. Moreover, the term "laborer" has no 
precise meaning in the circumstances before us without 
reference to some extrinsic evidence, be it Schedule A of 
the parties' expired agreement or testimony as to the 
negotiations. 
Finally, we reject the Village's argument that it can 
impose the understanding of its Trustees as to the content 
of the agreement upon CSEA. While the record supports the 
2/See F.I.T. v. Helsbv. 44 A.D.2d 550. 7 PERB 1f7005 
(1st Dept. 1974). 
—''see. N.Y. Jurisprudence Evidence §597 e_t seq. 
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proposition that the Village's chief negotiator did not 
provide a thorough explanation of the agreement to the 
Trustees before they ratified it. that ratification process 
is of no consequence with respect to the validity of the 
agreement. It was an internal matter involving only 
agencies of the Village. The Trustees sought as much 
information from their negotiator as they thought necessary 
in order to consider the agreement. If their understanding 
of that agreement was inadequate, the reason is not 
attributable to CSEA. The agreement made by the Village's 
negotiator was ratified and the Village cannot repudiate it 
now. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ. and 
WE ORDER the Village of Port Chester to: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to 
include in any collective bargaining 
agreement offered for execution a 
pay grade increase for sanitation 
men from grade nine to grade ten; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the 
Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc.; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at 
all locations used by it for written 
communications to members of 
9845 
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the bargaining unit represented by 
the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc. 
August 13, 1985 
Albany, New York 
M^AJZ^? '^P7^J<U~^ 
Harold R. Newman,Chairman 
Walter L. Eiseriberg, Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Village of Port Chester represented 
by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) that the 
Village of Port Chester: 
1. Will not refuse to include in any collective bargaining 
agreement with the CSEA offered for execution a pay 
grade increase for sanitation men from grade nine to 
grade ten, and 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA.' 
Village of Port Chester 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION. AFL/CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7934 
DAVID LEEMHUIS. 
Charging Party. 
RICHARD CASAGRANDE, ESQ.. for Respondent 
DAVID G. LEEMHUIS. p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of David 
Leemhuis to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing his charge against New York State Public 
Employees Federation. AFL/CIO (PEF) on the merits. We also 
have cross-exceptions complaining that the ALJ erred in 
rejecting affirmative defenses alleging that the charge 
should have been dismissed because Leemhuis had no standing 
to bring it. that it was barred by res judicata, that it was 
not timely filed, and that Leemhuis had failed to exhaust 
remedies available to him before PEF. 
PEF also objects to our consideration of Leemhuis1 
exceptions on the ground that the exceptions were served 
upon it one day late. Leemhuis, in a reply to PEF's 
984S 
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cross-exceptions, acknowledges that the exceptions were 
mailed a day late, but argues that they should be considered 
by us because PEF was not prejudiced by the delay. We 
reject this argument. "Absent the consent of all parties, 
this Board has consistently applied its timeliness rules in 
a strict manner."— However, even if Leemhuis' exceptions 
were timely, we would dismiss them on the merits. Moreover, 
as a courtesy to Leemhuis. who is appearing pro se. we 
explain our reasons for this. 
Leemhuis is in a negotiating unit represented by PEF 
but is not a member of that employee organization. 
Accordingly, he pays an agency shop fee pursuant to 
§208.3(a) of the Taylor Law. As a consequence of the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ellis v. Brotherhood 
7/ 
of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks.—7 PEF revised 
its prior agency shop fee refund procedure on May 11. 1984 
to provide for a predetermination of the amount of money it 
would spend in aid of political or ideological causes only 
incidentally related to terms and conditions of employment 
and for an escrow account to hold this rebatable share of 
1/county of Nassau. 14 PERB ir30l4. aff'd. County of 
Nassau v. PERB. 14 PERB ir7023 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1981). 
2/ U.S. , 104 Sup. Ct. 1883. 17 PERB T7511 
(1984). 
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the agency shop fees of nonmembers who demand a refund. A 
state court found this procedure to satisfy constitutional 
standards articulated in Ellis, but it directed Leemhuis to 
exhaust his PERB remedies to the extent that he had alleged 
3/ 
other than constitutional claims.— PEF further revised 
its refund procedure in October 1984. It segregated from 
its general fund an amount of money equal to 100% of the 
agency shop fees paid by nonmembers who demanded the return 
of part of their agency shop fee deductions. These monies 
were placed in an escrow account. The actual agency shop 
fee monies for these and other nonmembers. which were sent 
by the State Comptroller to PEF on a bi-weekly basis 
thereafter, were then deposited in PEF's general fund and 
used by it for all purposes including political and 
ideological ones. 
Leemhuis1 charge complains that this procedure 
constitutes improper commingling of agency shop fees with 
membership dues and improper expenditure of agency shop fee 
monies for political and ideological purposes. He 
therefore asserts that it violates §208.3(a) of the Taylor 
Law. 
1/Leemhuis v. PEF. 17 PERB V7518 (Sup. Ct. 
Schenectady Co. 1984). 
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This argument rests upon a theory that the actual 
dollars themselves that comprise an individual's agency 
shop fee payments must be identified and segregated from 
those constituting the dues of union members and even from 
the agency shop fee payments of nonmembers who have not 
demanded partial return of their monies. This is an absurd 
position. Money is fungible. Moreover, PEF never collects 
identifiable dollars from any persons paying agency shop 
fees. All it receives regularly is a check from the State 
Comptroller crediting it with the sum of the money payable 
by all nonmember unit employees for a stated period. We 
therefore find that the procedure adopted by PEF satisfies 
) §208.3(a) of the Taylor Law. 
Leemhuis also appears to be arguing that PEF must 
segregate all agency shop fee payments, whether or not the 
payer has demanded a refund. This is not required. 
Section 208.3(a) of the Taylor Law merely provides for the 
establishment and maintenance of: 
a procedure providing for the refund of any 
employee demanding the return any part of an 
agency shop fee deduction which represents 
the employee's pro rata share of expenditures 
by the organization in aid of activities or 
causes of a political or ideological nature 
only incidentally related to terms and 
conditions of employment. (emphasis supplied) 
We now address PEF's cross-exceptions. The ALJ did 
not err in finding that Leemhuis has standing to file a 
^ charge. The basis of PEF's argument is that while Leemhuis 
9851 
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had filed demands for agency shop fee refunds for prior 
years, he had not filed such a demand for the year covered by 
the charge. Leemhuis is a member of a class that is affected 
by whether or not PEF's refund procedure is valid, and his 
failure to file a refund demand would have affected the 
remedy had he been successful in the charge, but not his 
standing. By not filing a demand he would not have been 
entitled to a make-whole remedy because §208.3(a) of the 
Taylor Law provides that only agency shop fee payers making a 
demand are entitled to refunds. We might, however, have 
issued a cease and desist remedy which could have been of 
benefit to Leemhuis even without his having filed a refund 
demand for any particular year. 
We affirm the ALJ's determination that Leemhuis1 
charge was not barred by res judicata. It was not barred by 
the court determination that its procedure of May 1984 was 
constitutional because the court did not dispose of the 
claims not relating to constitutionality, leaving them to 
this Board. Neither was Leemhuis1 claim barred by his 
withdrawal of an earlier charge which had originally raised, 
inter alia, aspects of the issue before us.— 
1/see PEF (Leemhuis). 17 PERB 1P037 (1984). Leemhuis 
withdrew that charge after a pre-hearing conference at 
which the ALJ informed him that he would not rule on any of 
the issues before him other than one that is not relevant 
to this charge. 
9852 
Board - U-7934 -6 
We also affirm the determination of the ALJ that the 
conduct complained of by Leemhuis, if wrongful, would have 
constituted a continuing violation and therefore his charge 
was not untimely. Finally, we affirm the ruling that 
Leemhuis need not have exhausted procedures made available 
. . . 57 
by PEF before filing the charge herein.— Accordingly, 
we find no merit in PEF's cross-exceptions. 
Having found Leemhuis' exceptions untimely and no 
merit in those filed by PEF, WE ORDER that all exceptions 
be, and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: August 13. 1985 
Albany, New York 
%^-^Z/CA 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Meipfoer 
i / S e e UUP (Barry) . 13 PERB 1f3090 (1980) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
^ 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION. AFL/CIO. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7950 
DAVID LEEMHUIS. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion of David Leemhuis to 
reopen the decision of the Board in the matter herein.— 
The motion is opposed by the Public Employees Federation. 
Leemhuis asserts that we failed to deal with two aspects 
of his charge. The first is that the Public Employees 
Federation's refund procedure is inadequate because it leads 
to incorrect refund amounts. This, he argues, is different 
from a complaint that the amount is incorrect, and it is the 
latter rather than the former question which lies beyond this 
Board's jurisdiction. 
We reject this argument on the ground that the 
distinction made by Leemhuis is of no consequence. 
^Decided at 18 PERB ir3051 (1985). 
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The second basis of Leemhuis's motion is his assertion 
that his charge complained that the information furnished 
himwith respect to the amount of his refund was inadequate 
and that we dismissed this charge on the basis of a misunder-
standing that he had complained that the information was 
inaccurate. His assertion is in error. We specifically 
determined in the instant case that the minimum information 
which must be provided was provided by the Public Employees 
Federation. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the motion herein be. and 
it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: August 13. 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies.\Member 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE 
CITY OF AMSTERDAM. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2876 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC., LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES. INC. (JOSEPH KELLY, of 
Counsel), for Employer 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (RICHARD L. 
BURSTEIN, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000 AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
its petition to represent the noninstructional employees of 
the Enlarged City School District of the City of Amsterdam 
(District) in a single unit.— Most of the noninstructional 
i^A few noninstructional job titles are not covered 
by the petition; their exclusion raises no issue before us. 
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employees of the District are presently represented by CSEA 
in three units, a custodial-maintenance unit, a clerical unit 
and an aides unit. These units have existed from 12 to 17 
years and have been represented by CSEA from 7 to 14 years. 
CSEA also seeks the inclusion of seven unrepresented titles 
in the consolidated unit. They are physical therapist, 
physical therapist assistant, occupational therapist, 
occupational therapist assistant, senior computer operator, 
junior computer operator and teacher registry agent. 
It is the position of the District that the three 
existing units should not be consolidated and that the 
additional titles sought by CSEA should constitute a separate 
unit. 
The Director decided that consolidation of the existing 
units was inappropriate because there has been "a long 
history of effective negotiations." He also agreed with the 
District that the unrepresented titles sought by CSEA should 
be placed in a new and separate unit. 
CSEA argues that the record demonstrates a long history 
of ineffective negotiations. The basis of this proposition 
is that the negotiations in each of the three units for at 
least the last three rounds have gone to impasse, that 
several have gone to fact-finding and that none was resolved 
prior to the expiration of the predecessor agreement, with 
several of the impasses continuing over a year after that 
expiration. It also argues that the seven unrepresented 
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titles constitute too small a group for effective 
representation and should be included in an existing unit. 
We are not persuaded by CSEA's argument that consistent 
resort to impasse procedures is so clear an indicia of 
ineffective negotiations as to justify a change in the unit 
structure. Moreover, there is nothing in the record that 
suggests that the consolidation of the three units would lead 
to easier negotiations or quicker settlement. On the 
contrary, there are some indications that it might exacerbate 
the negotiation difficulties. Accordingly, we affirm the 
determination of the Director that the three existing units 
should not be combined. 
The remaining issue is what to do with the unrepresented 
employees covered by the petition. 
The record indicates that the four therapist positions 
7 I 
and the two computer positions— are professional or 
quasi-professional, a college degree being a requirement for 
appointment. As such, they share a community of interest 
among themselves which is not shared with the members of any 
3/ 
of the three units.— 
^These involve programming rather than clerical 
responsibilities. 
^At one time there was a unit consisting of the 
therapist positions. Subsequently, the District 
subcontracted the work of the unit, but it later returned 
to the use of employees to provide therapy services. 
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The same is not true of the Teacher Registry Agent. 
This employee keeps track of teacher absences and seeks 
substitutes as needed. At a previous time this work was 
performed by employees in the clerical unit; indeed, the 
1983-85 collective bargaining agreement for that unit has a 
4/ provision applicable to that work.— Accordingly, we place 
5/ this title in the existing clerical employees unit.— 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER: 
1. that the Custodial/Maintenance Unit and 
the Aides Unit continue unchanged; 
2. that the Teacher Registry Agent be added 
to the Clerical Unit which shall now 
consist of the following titles: 
Included: typist, stenographer. 
keypunch operator, telephone 
operator, account clerk, 
senior stenographer, 
principal stenographer, 
teacher registry agent. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
The District is hereby directed to 
submit to the Director within ten days 
of its receipt of this decision, with 
copy to the petitioner, an alphabetized 
yArticle V. I. 
S-^ For the appropriateness of our defining negotiating, 
units not proposed by any party, see County of Erie, 18 PERB 
1f3045 (1985). 
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list of the current employees within 
this unit. It is ordered that an 
election by secret ballot shall be held 
under the Director's supervision among 
the employees in the above unit unless 
CSEA submits, within fifteen days after 
receipt of the employee list, evidence 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of §201.9(g) of the Rules for 
certification without an election. 
that there be a unit, as follows: 
Included: physical therapist, physical 
therapist assistant, 
occupational therapist, 
occupational therapist 
assistant, senior computer 
operator and junior computer 
operator. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
The District is hereby directed to 
submit to the Director within ten days 
of its receipt of this decision, with 
copy to the petitioner, an alphabetized 
list of the current employees within 
this unit. As CSEA's showing of 
interest consisted of proof of the then 
current membership in the existing 
units, it is hereby directed to submit 
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to the Director, within fifteen days of 
its receipt of the alphabetized employee 
list, the requisite thirty percent 
showing of interest from the employees 
in the unit; otherwise the petition will 
be dismissed. 
Conditioned upon the submission of 
the requisite showing of interest as 
stated above, it is ordered that an 
election by secret ballot shall be held 
under the Director's supervision among 
the employees in the above unit unless 
CSEA submits, within the above described 
fifteen days, evidence sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g) of 
the Rules for certification without an 
election. 
DATED: August 13. 1985 
Albany, New York 
^/W-^s^/t-
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies,\Memb 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD. CASE NO. S-0003 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Section 212 of the Civil Service Law (CSL) declares 
certain provisions of the Taylor Law inapplicable to those 
local governments which have adopted their own provisions and 
procedures which have been submitted to this Board and as to 
which "...there is in effect a determination by the board 
that such provisions and procedures and the continuing 
implementation thereof are substantially equivalent..." to 
those which control this Board (emphasis supplied). 
To permit this Board to ascertain annually whether the 
continuing implementation of local provisions and procedures 
are substantially equivalent to those which govern it. this 
Board's Counsel canvasses the appropriate governments each 
year to gather data on the operation of the local 
government's public employment relations boards (local PERBs). 
In early February. 1985, a letter and questionnaire were 
sent to the last-known chairman and last-known counsel of the 
Town of Hempstead local PERB. Follow-up letters were sent in 
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March and April. The April communication advised that 
failure to receive a response would result in a 
recommendation to this Board that the Hempstead local PERB be 
determined not to be in substantial compliance with the 
requirements of the Taylor Law. Receiving neither 
acknowledgment nor a response to the questionnaire. Counsel, 
as he had advised the local PERB in his April letter, made 
the indicated recommendation, which this Board considered at 
its May 8, 1985 meeting. The Deputy Chairman of this Board 
was thereupon directed to advise the Hempstead local PERB 
that this Board had considered the recommendation of Counsel, 
was offering the Hempstead local PERB an opportunity to 
respond to the recommendation by May 31. 1985, and that 
submission of the completed questionnaire would make further 
action unnecessary. Such advice was sent to the Hempstead 
local PERB by letter dated May 14. 1985. 
To date, we have received neither an acknowledgement of 
our letters nor a response to the questionnaire. We are no 
longer warranted in concluding that the continuing 
implementation by the Town of Hempstead local PERB of its 
provisions and procedures, if indeed they are being 
implemented at all, is substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures governing this Board. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the determination of this 
Board dated April 11. 1968,—* 
approving the enactment establishing a 
local PERB for the Town of Hempstead be. 
and the same is hereby, suspended 
subject to reinstatement upon 
application and demonstration by the 
Hempstead local PERB that the continuing 
implementation of its local provisions 
and procedures is substantially 
equivalent to those governing this Board; 
FURTHERMORE. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that 
unless such application is filed by 
September 6. 1985. this Board shall, 
without further notice, rescind, pursuant 
to CSL §212, its order dated April 11. 
1968. approving the Town of Hempstead's 
local enactment and such other orders as 
approved amendments to its local 
A/l PERB 1F39 5 
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enactment— upon the ground that the 
continuing implementation of said local 
enactment and amendments thereof is no 
longer substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures applicable to 
this Board. 
DATED: August 13. 1985 
Albany. New York 
§ £ 3 ^ L^^2^c 
H a r o l d R. Newman. Cha i rman 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g . Memfe^r 
2 / 4 PERB ir3019; 5 PERB ir3041; 6 PERB 1[3081; 
11 PERB 1f3059 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF BROOME. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO, C-2945 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 693, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 1912, COUNCIL 66. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 1912, Council 66, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees employed in the titles as 
set forth in Appendix A. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 1912, Council 66. 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: August 13, 198 5 
Albany, New York 
Hae-pld R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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Appendix A 
HIGHWAY DIVISION 
MEO Heavy 
S hove1 Operator 
MEO Light 
Painter 
Carpenter 
Laborer 
Carpenter Helper 
Mechanic Heavy 
Motor Equipment Clerk 
Stock Clerk 
MEO Medium 
Mechanic Helper 
Apprentice Mechanic 
Assistant Heavy Mechanic 
DRAINAGE. SANITATION AND WATER SUPPLY DIVISION 
MEO Heavy 
Sanitary and Landfill Mechanic 
Sanitary Landfill Clerk 
Laborer 
BUILDING AND GROUNDS DIVISION 
Janitor 
Bldg. Maint. Man I. II 
Parking Lot Attendant 
Electrician 
& III 
Elevator Operator 
Auto Mechanic 
PARKS DEPARTMENT 
MEO Heavy 
Mechanic 
Construction Worker 
Park Technician. 
Arborist 
Sr. Park Technician 
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